Brooklyn Law School

BrooklynWorks
Faculty Scholarship

1982

Free Speech, Property, and the Burger Court: Old
Values, New Balances
Joel Gora
Norman Dorsen

Follow this and additional works at: https://brooklynworks.brooklaw.edu/faculty
Part of the Civil Law Commons, First Amendment Commons, and the Legislation Commons
Recommended Citation
1982 Sup. Ct. Rev. 195 (1982)

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by BrooklynWorks. It has been accepted for inclusion in Faculty Scholarship by an authorized
administrator of BrooklynWorks.

NORMAN

DORSEN

JOEL GORA

FREE SPEECH, PROPERTY, AND
THE BURGER COURT:

OLD

VALUES, NEW BALANCES

When we balance the Constitutional rights of owners of property against those of the people to enjoy freedom of the press and
religion, as we must here, we remain mindful of the fact that the
latter occupy a preferred position.
Marsh v. Alabama (1946)'
It would be an unwarranted infringement of property rights to
require them to yield to the exercise of First Amendment rights
under circumstances where adequate alternative avenues of communication exist. Such an accommodation would diminish property rights without significantly enhancing the asserted right of
free speech.
Lloyd Corp. v. Tanner
(1972)2
I. INTRODUCTION
More than a decade has passed since Lewis F. Powell and
William H. Rehnquist were appointed to the Supreme Court by
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© 1983 by The University of Chicago. All rights reserved.
0-226-46435-0/83/1982-0040$01.00

196

THE SUPREME COURT REVIEW

[1982

Richard Nixon, bringing to full complement the judicial institution
now known as the "Burger Court." Scholars and commentators
have begun to assess the Court's work in a systematic way. 3 A few
years ago we had occasion to begin our own analysis, focusing on
the Court's seemingly disharmonious free speech rulings. In some
instances, the Burger Court's free speech decisions seemed to contract earlier rulings of the Warren Court, in others to expand on
those decisions. In some cases they dramatically chart new ground. 4
The Burger Court's commercial speech rulings have now established that substantial First Amendment protection is accorded to
speech about goods and services, no matter how commonplace a
product may be.5 A free speech claim has been given heightened
protection where it was augmented by the speaker's right to use and
control his own items of property.6 Conversely, where a free
speech claim, especially a claimed right to use a particular forum,
conflicted with the interests of the private or governmental owner
of the forum, the Court has frequently rejected the free speech
claim.7 Further, the Court has upheld restrictions on use of property for sexually oriented speech, in large part because of the impact on surrounding property owners.' Finally, the Court has con' See generally Symposium, The Burger Court: Reflections on the First Decade, 43 LAw &
CONTF_MP. PROB. (1980); Galloway, The First Decade of the Burger Court: ConserativeDominance (1969-1979), 21 SANTA CLARA L. REv. 891 (1981). See also the forthcoming selection
of essays, edited by Professor Vince Blasi, entitled THE BURGER COURT: CONTINUITY,
REACTION, OR DRIFT? (1983). In addition to the four Justices appointed by Richard Nixon,
there have been tvo more recent changes in personnel: Justice Stevens replaced Justice
Douglas, and Justice O'Connor replaced Justice Stewart. Three members of the Warren
Court-Justices Brennan, White, and Marshall-remain. Although we use the name "Burger Court" to describe the presentCourt, we are aware, of course, that it is not a monolithic
body and that every member has differed with some of the Court's free speech decisions.
' For a genera'l discussion of the Burger Court's work in the First Amendment area, see
Emerson, FirstAmendment Doctrine and the Burger Court, 68 CAL. L. REV. 422 (1980); Cox,
Foreword: Freedom of Expression in the Burger Court, 94 HARV. L. REv. 1 (1980).
' See, e.g., Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, 425
U.S. 748 (1976).
6 This has been particularly true, for example, in certain cases involving claims of misuse
of the American flag for speech purposes. See, e.g., Spence v. Washington, 418 U.S. 405
(1974).
' See, e.g., Lloyd Corp. v. Tanner, 407 U.S. 551 (1972); Greer v. Spock, 424 U.S. 828
(1976); Hudgens v. NLRB, 424 U.S. 507 (1976); CBS v. Democratic National Committee,
412 U.S. 94 (1973); Miami Herald Pub. Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241 (1974); FCC v.
WNCN Listeners Guild, 101 S. Ct. 1266 (1981). But if. PruneYard Shopping Center v.
Robins, 447 U.S. 74 (1980); CBS, Inc. v. FCC, 101 S. Ct. 2813 (1981).
' See, e.g., Young v. American Mini-Theaters, 427 U.S. 50 (1976). But see Schad v. Mt.
Ephraim, 101 S. Ct. 2176 (1981).
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sistently held that speech may not be restricted in order to redress
inequalities in the competitive "marketplace of ideas" resulting
from disparities in wealth. 9
These cases suggested a new dimension to free speech rulings
which can be summarized by the word "property." 10 With some
exceptions, whether free speech claims receive protection in the
Burger Court turns on the presence of an underlying "proprietary"
interest, private or governmental. Free speech values are protected
when they coincide with or are augmented by property interests.
Conversely, free expression has received diminished protection
when First Amendment claims clash with property interests. To
borrow Professor Kalven's useful phrase, when free speech claims
are weighed in the balance, property interests determine on which
side of the scales "the thumb of the Court" will be placed.' 1
In the 1981 Term the Court's docket contained two pertinent
free speech cases. In Princeton University v. Schmid, 2 Schmid had
been convicted of criminal trespass for distributing political leaflets
on a privately owned campus without obtaining the prior approval
required by University regulations. The New Jersey Supreme
Court overturned the conviction.1 3 But the New Jersey court declined to decide Schmid's claimed First Amendment right of access. 14 Instead, encouraged by the PruneYardcase, 15 the state court
turned to the New Jersey constitution to determine whether its free
' See, e.g., Miami Herald Pub. Co. v. Tornillo, note 7 supra; Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S.
1, 48-49 (1976); First National Bank v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765 (1978). Cf.Consolidated
Edison Co. v. Public Service Commission, 447 U.S. 530 (1980).
"0The property element in free speech adjudication is not new. As early as 1919, Justice
Holmes employed a commercial metaphor in his first dissenting opinion in a free speech case:
"But when men have realized that time has upset many fighting faiths, they may come to
believe even more than they believe the very foundations of their own conduct that the
ultimate good desired is better reached by free trade in ideas-that the best test of truth is the
power of the thought to get itself accepted in the competition of the market." Abrams v.
United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919). But to use a marketplace concept as a formula for
protecting speech is very different from the "new dimension" for property in recent First
Amendment cases. Nor has Holmes's language of commerce escaped criticism. See TRIBE,
AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAw 576-77 (1978); Baker, Scope of the Firt Amendment Freedora of Speech, 25 U.C.L.A.L. REv. 964, 966 (1978).
" See Kalven, The Concept of the Public Forum, 1965 SUPRE._\ECOURT REVIEw 1, 28 (1965).
1, 102 S. Ct. 867 (1982).
"

State v. Schmid, 84 N.J. 535, 423 A.2d 615 (1980).

1484 N.J. at 522, 423 A.2d at 624.

"sRobins v. PruneYard Shopping Center, 23 Cal.3d 899, 592 P.2d 341 (1979), aff'd, 447
U.S. 74 (1980).
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speech clause protected the defendant's activity.1 6 The court found
that such free speech rights were available even upon private property, where the property is in some fashion devoted to a public use.
Applying the test to Princeton University, the court concluded that
the defendant's activity was consonant with the purposes and institutional integrity of a university and that Princeton's regulations
contained no reasonable standards to justify limiting that activity.
Princeton vigorously contended that the ruling deprived it of First
and Fourteenth Amendment rights of speech and property and
appealed the decision to the Supreme Court. The Court dismissed
the appeal for lack of a justiciable controversy. 17
The second case was Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV
Corp.'8 A New York statute required landlords to permit cable
television companies to install wires on the landlord's property so
that tenants could subscribe to the cable service. The statute was
based on the State's speech-related interest in "rapid development
of and maximum penetration by a means of communication which
has important educational and community aspects."' 9 A landlord
filed suit, maintaining that the statute authorized a physical trespass on her property and thereby constituted a "taking" without
compensation. The New York Court of Appeals, six to one, rejected her claims,2 ° but the Supreme Court reversed. The Court
held that the trespass sanctioned by the New York statute constituted a traditional taking of property interests which was not
justified by the State's concerns with facilitating tenant access to a
new medium of communication.
The Loretto case provides evidence to support the hypothesis that
property concepts are of critical importance in the current Supreme
16 State v. Schmid, 84 N.J. at 563-69, 423 A.2d at 630-33. On the increasingly common
resort to state constitutional provisions to protect individual liberty, see Dorsen, State ConstitutionalLaw: An Introductory Survey, 15 CONN. L. REV. 99 (1982).
" The Court's per curiam ruling noted that the State of New Jersey, whose prosecution
had been terminated by the state Supreme Court's decision, had not filed an appeal, and
there appeared to be no contest between the State and Schmid. The claims of Princeton
University, which had intervened in the state appellate proceedings to protect its interests,
were found moot because the University had, in the interim, amended its regulations whose
violation had prompted the original trespass conviction. See 102 S. Ct. 867 (1982). See
discussion in text at notes 147 and 148 infra.
' 102 S. Ct. 3164 (1982).

19 Ibid.
20 53 N.Y.2d 124 (1981).
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Court's disposition of free speech interests. This article will test
this hypothesis.
II. THE BURGER COURT AND PROPERTY RIGHTS
"[T]he concept of property never has been, is not, and never
can be of definite content."2 1 Traditionally, property rights were
synonymous with ownership and control of corporeal things such
as land and chattels, and certain intangibles such as bills, notes,
stocks, and bonds."2 More recently, the concept has expanded to
encompass claimed entitlements to governmental benefits, status,
and other economic rights-the "new property":23
Wealth or value is created by culture and by society; it is
culture that makes a diamond valuable and a pebble worthless.
Property, on the other hand, is the creation of law. A man who
has property has certain legal rights with respect to an item of
wealth; property represents a relationship between wealth and
its "owner."
American law has been torn by ambivalence between viewing
property as something over which individuals have "sole and despotic dominion '' 24 or as something less than that as defined by
community interests. Judge James L. Oakes has described this
25
dualism as follows:
[O]ne view of "property" emphasizes that we are independent
individuals; the other emphasizes that we are parts of a social
whole. Obviously, under the former, or "dominion," view of
property, the legal system will tolerate a lesser degree of interference from the state by way of taxation or regulation than would
be the case under the latter, or "social" view of property. Most
judges, including those on the Supreme Court ....
commence
analysis with both views as part of their value apparatus.
21 Philbrick, Changing Conceptions of Property in Law, 86 U. PA. L. REV. 691, 696 (1938).
22 Id. at 691-92; see Van Alstyne, Cracks in "The New Property": Adjudicative Due Process in
the Administrative State, 62 CORNELL L. REV. 445, 453 (1977).
23 Reich, The New Property, 73 YALE L.J. 733 (1964); see Oakes, "Property Rights" in
ConstitutionalAnalysis Today, 56 WASH L. REV. 583, 587 (1981).
24 Blackstone spoke of private property as the "sole and despotic dominion ... over the
external things of the world, in total exclusion of the right of any other individual in the
universe." Quoted in Powell, The Relationship between Property Rights and Civil Rights, 15
HAST. L.J. 135, 139 (1963).
2 Oakes, note 23 supra, at 587.
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Although the Burger Court may have included both views of
property as part of its "value apparatus," it has pretty firmly resolved the ambivalence by protecting individual "dominion" rather
than communal interests. It has done this by extolling economic
autonomy and entrepreneurial freedom at the expense of public
regulation and movement toward equality. Several lines of decision
are instructive.
The first traces to the tentative judicial stirrings during the 1960s
that poverty, or lack of wealth, could not constitutionally deprive
Americans of certain benefits enjoyed by others.16 Starting in 1970,
the Burger Court rejected the imposition of wealth redistribution as
constitutionally compelled in the areas of minimum family assistance, housing, and expenditures on public education. 2 7 More recently, it has upheld wealth-based obstacles to the exercise of a
series of rights that the Court had previously determined to be
"fundamental"-access to the courts,2" voting rights,2 9 and abortion. 3" In these cases the Court has made plain that, while the
Constitution "does not enact Mr. Herbert Spencer's Social Statics," 3 1 neither does it embody John Rawls's A Theory of Justice.
Second, the Burger Court has cramped the development of the
Warren Court's constitutional protection for the "new property."32
The Court has not denied the existence of the new property. It has
understood that property interests may include entitlements arising
from reasonable expectations and reliances generated by statutory
and regulatory schemes.3 3 But it has proved stingy in the protection
26 See Harper v. Virginia Board of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966); Kramer v. Union Free
School District No. 15, 395 U.S. 621 (1969); Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963);
Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371 (1971); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969).
27 See, e.g., Dandridgev. Williams, 397 U.S. 471 (1970);James v. Valtierra, 402 U.S. 137
(1971); San Antonio Indep. School District v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973).
2 See United States v. Kras, 409 U.S. 434 (1973); Ortwein v. Schwab, 410 U.S. 656
(1973); Lassiterv. Dept. of Social Services, 452 U.S. 18 (1981). But see Littlev. Streater, 452
U.S. 1 (1981). On the criminal side, as well, the Burger Court has tolerated disparities based
on wealth in access to legal assistance. See Ross v. Moffitt, 417 U.S. 600 (1974); Fuller v.
Oregon, 417 U.S. 40, 53 (1974).
29 See Salyer Land Co. v. Tulare Lake Basin Water Storage Dist., 410 U.S. 719, 738
(1973) (Douglas, J., dissenting). See also Ball v. James, 451 U.S. 355 (1981).
30 See Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464 (1977); Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297 (1980).
31 Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 75 (1905) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
32 See Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970); Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535 (1971).

3 See Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 576-77 (1972); Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S.
565 (1975). In Lynch v. Household Finance, 405 U.S. 538, 552 (1972), the Court spoke
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of such property interests by imposing two critical limitations on
them. First, what constitutes an entitlement would be defined by
34
federal or state law:
Property interests, of course, are not created by the Constitution. Rather, they are created and their dimensions are defined
by existing rules or understandings that stem from an independent source such as state law-rules or understandings that secure certain benefits and that support claims of entitlement to
those benefits.
Second, the same source of law that established the "entitlement"
could also restrict it, either expressly, as by limiting a faculty appointment to a one-year term, or, indirectly, by circumscribing the
procedures available to protect that interest.
The Burger Court has not shown the same parsimonious protection of more traditional forms of property and entrepreneurial interests.36 Indeed, the Court has dusted off a long disused constitutional provision designed to thwart governmental interference with
economic rights-the constitutional prohibition against any state
law "impairing the Obligation of Contracts." In 1977, after more
than forty years of desuetude, the Clause was invoked to invalidate
the statutory repeal of a restriction on the ability of the Port of New
York Authority to use revenues and reserves to subsidize mass
transit contrary to the terms of the bond indenture.3 7 In dissent,
Justice Brennan charged that such use of the Contracts Clause
created a "constitutional safe haven for property rights embodied in
a contract," and "substantially distorts modern constitutional jurisbroadly of the important relationship between liberty and rights in property-even "new"
property: "[Tihe dichotomy between personal liberties and property rights is a false one.
Property does not have rights. People have rights. The right to enjoy property without
unlawful deprivation, no less than the right to speak or the right to travel, is, in truth, a
'personal' right, whether the 'property' in question be a welfare check, a home, or a savings
account. In fact, a fundamental interdependence exists between the personal right to liberty
and the personal right to property. Neither could have meaning without the other. That
rights in property are basic civil rights has long been recognized."
34Roth, 408 U.S. at 577; see Perry v. Sinderman, 408 U.S. 593 (1972).
" See Bishop v. Wood, 426 U.S. 341 (1976). But see Monaghan, Of "Liberty" and "Property," 62 CORNELL L. REV. 405 (1977); Van Alstyne, Cracks in "The New Property," 62
CORNELL L. REV. 445 (1977); Tushnet, The Newer Property: Suggestion for the Revival of
Substantive Due Procem, 1975 SUPRE.ME COURT REvIEW 261.
' See Oakes, note 23 supra;Michelman, Propertyas a ConstitutionalRight,38 WASH.& LEE
L. REV. 1097 (1981).
11United States Trust Co. v. New Jersey, 431 U.S. 1 (1977).
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prudence governing regulation of private economic interests." 8
The next year, the Contract Clause was used to invalidate a state

statute that imposed financial obligations, beyond the terms of
labor contracts, on private companies that terminated existing pension plans.3 9 Three dissenters insisted that the decision threatened

"to undermine the jurisprudence of property rights":4 ° "Decisions
over the past 50 years have developed a coherent, unified interpretation of all the Constitutional provisions that may protect economic expectations and these decisions have recognized a broad
latitude in States to effect even severe interference with existing
economic values when reasonably necessary to promote the general
welfare."

Finally, the Court has wholly removed many economic activities
from the sphere of governmental or "state action" and thereby from
potential constitutional restraints. As Professor Nowak has
41
observed:
The issue in such [state action] cases is whether the actions of
nominally private parties should be subject to constitutional restraints ....

The libertarian Burger Court has reduced govern-

ment regulation and limitation of property rights by leaving
broadcasters free to refuse editorial advertising, private clubs
free to discriminate by race, private utilities free to turn off a
customer's power, shopping center owners free to exclude picketers and speakers from their property, and creditors free to engage in self-help.
In sum, the Burger Court has restricted the constitutional scope of
Id. at 33.
39 Allied Structural Steel Co. v. Spannaus, 438 U.S. 234 (1978).
40 Id. at 260. Outside the Contracts Clause cases, see also Kaiser Aetna v. United States,
444 U.S. 164 (1979); Loretto v. Teleprompter, 102 S. Ct. 3164 (1982); Raymond Motor
Transportation, Inc. v. Rice, 434 U.S. 429 (1978); Philadelphia v. NewJersey, 437 U.S. 617
(1978); Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322 (1979); Kassel v. Consolidated Freightways
Corp., 450 U.S. 662 (1981). Where the state in its "proprietary" capacity has entered the
market, the Court has allowed it, as buyer or seller, to discriminate against competing
business interests. See, e.g., Hughes v. Alexandria Scrap Corp., 426 U.S. 794 (1976); Reeves
v. Stake, 447 U.S. 429 (1980); see generally Wells & Hellerstein, The GovernmentalProprietaryDistinction in Constitutional Law, 66 VA. L. REV. 1073 (1980). The Court has
nevertheless stopped well short of a full-scale return to the Lochner era and the use of
substantive due process or equal protection to protect property interests. See, e.g., Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery Co., 449 U.S. 456 (1981); Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining
& Reclamation Ass'n, 452 U.S. 264 (1981).
41 Nowak, Foreword:Evaluating the Work of the New LibertarianSupreme Court, 7 HASTINGS
L.Q. 263, 288 (1980).
'8
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government regulation of private economic activity, thereby expanding the "dominion" of owners over their property. Or 42as depicted by Professor Van Alstyne, the Court has expressed:
" , * a different, tighter, more conservative view of liberty:
liberty as security of private property; liberty as freedom of
entrepreneurial skill; liberty from the impositions of government
and of third parties from disposing of "one's own." Liberty, in
brief, more in the mode of John Locke and of Adam Smith and
somewhat less in the mode of John Mill (or of John Rawls).

It should not be surprising, therefore, that the Court's free speech
cases have revealed a similar sensitivity to private economic
interests.
III. THE BURGER COURT AND FREE SPEECH
What did the free speech landscape look like in early 1972,
when Justices Powell and Rehnquist joined the Court? Even a
casual observer might have been struck by a remarkable series of
free speech decisions rendered toward the end of the Warren Court
era. Two decisions in June 1971 seemed particularly noteworthy.
The first was a characteristically careful analysis by Justice Harlan
holding that California could not punish as disorderly conduct the
public display of the words "Fuck the Draft" in a Los Angeles
43
courthouse. Justice Harlan said:
For, while the particular four-letter word being litigated here
is perhaps more distasteful than most others of its genre, it is
nevertheless often true that one man's vulgarity is another's
lyric. Indeed, we think it is largely because governmental
officials cannot make principled distinctions in this area that the
Constitution leaves matters of taste and style so largely to the
individual.
In the other 1971 decision, the Pentagon Papers case, the Supreme
Court defended the First Amendment's basic purposes against a
direct attack. In his concurring opinion Justice Black said:'
2 Van Alstyne, The Recrudescence of PropertyRights as the Foremost Pncipleof Civil Liberties:

The First Decade of the Burger Court, 43 LAw & CorEMMP. PROB. 66, 70 (1980). See also

Nowak, note 41 supra.
43 Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 25 (1971).
' New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 717 (1971) (concurring opinion).
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Only a free and unrestrained press can effectively expose deception in government. And paramount among the responsibilities of a free press is the duty to prevent any part of the
government from deceiving the people and sending them off to
distant lands to die of foreign fevers and foreign shot and shell.
These two cases capped a number of speech-protective rulings
that led free speech partisans to unaccustomed satisfaction. The
Court had adopted what appeared to be a rigorous standard for
testing restraints on political advocacy and in the process overruled
one of the most scorned decisions of an earlier era.4" It took steps to
cope with the "intractable" obscenity problem under normal First
Amendment criteria.4 6 It accorded the media broad protection
against defamation suits arising out of news stories on "matters of
public or general interest."4 7
But trouble brewed beneath the surface even then. The precise
condition of the First Amendment, if closely inspected, was more
uneven and less happy than appeared. First Amendment doctrine
was, in the view of one renowned scholar, in "chaos." At the time
of the notable free speech victories described above, Professor
48
Emerson decried the lack of a coherent First Amendment policy:
At various times the Court has employed the bad tendency
test, the clear and present danger test, an incitement test, and
different forms of the ad hoc balancing test. Sometimes it has not
clearly enunciated the theory upon which it proceeds. Frequently it has avoided decision on basic First Amendment issues
by invoking doctrines of vagueness, overbreadth, or the use of
less drastic alternatives. . . . The Supreme Court has also
utilized other doctrines, such as the preferred position of the
First Amendment and prior restraint. Recently it has begun to
address itself to problems of "symbolic speech" and the place in
which First Amendment activities can be carried on. But it has
totally failed to settle on any coherent approach.
The absence of a "coherent approach," regrettable in itself, also
seems pertinent to the use of property concepts in the Court's
recent free speech cases, because the more the Court relies on ad
4"Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969), overrulingWhitney v. California, 274 U.S.
357 (1927).
46 Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557 (1969).
4' Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., 403 U.S. 29 (1971).
48 F_imERSON, THE SYSTF_I OF FREEDOM OF ExPREssIoN 15-16 (1970).
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hoc First Amendment theories, the more influential can be "unrelated" grounds of decision. Put another way, when the Court persistently balances free speech interests, there is a doctrinal vacuum,
and the property "thumb" on the scale can be dispositive. 49
A. PROPERTY AND SPEECH UNITED

1. Speech linked to property. We start with the deceptively simple
flag cases. The principal case involved a young man convicted
under a statute prohibiting improper use of the American flag for
taping a peace symbol on a flag to protest national policies.5 ° Although a number of factors were relevant to the decision-absence
of a breach of the peace, the impermissibility of punishing the
appellant merely because others found his message offensive-the
Court treated'
property concepts as central in overturning the
5 1
conviction:
A number of factors are important in the instant case. First,
this was a privately owned flag. In a technical property sense it
was not the property of any government.... Second, appellant
displayed his flag on private property.

As the dissenters saw it, private ownership of the flag could not be

" Scholars have suggested formulations for protecting free speech values from dilution.
Professor Tribe's elaborate "two track" theoretical structure attempts to identify all governmental restrictions aimed at the "communicative impact" of expressive activity and treats

such restrictions as invalid.

TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW

580-601 (1978).

Professor Baker's formulation protects all speech "that manifests or contributes to the speaker's values or visions-speech which furthers the two key First Amendment values of selffulfillment and participation in change-as long as the speech does not involve violence or
coercion of another." Baker, Scope of FirstAmendment Freedom of Speech, 25 U.C.L.A.L. REV.
964, 1001-02 (1978). Others have suggested a "revitalized" clear-and-present-danger test,
Shaman, Revitalizing the Clear-and-Present-Danger
Test: Toward a PrincipledInterpretationof the
First Amendment, 22 VILL. L. REV. 60 (1976); rules forbidding controls based on content,
Bogen, The Supreme Court'sInterpretationof the Guarantee of Freedom of Speech, 35 MD. L. REV.
555 (1976); the "presumptive unconstitutionality of content discrimination," Karst, Public
Enterpriseand the PublicForum:A Comment on Southeastern Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad, 37 OHIO
ST. L.J. 247, 255 (1976); or a "heavily negative presumption" against control of public
speech, Meiklejohn, Public Speech in the Burger Court: The Ifluence of Mr. Jastice Black, 8
TOLEDO L. REV. 301, 304 (1977). A thoughtful analysis is found in HAIMAN, SPEECH AND
LAW IN A FREE SOCIETY (1981). See generally, DORSEN, BENDER, & NEUBORNE, I EMERSON, HABER & DORSEN'S POLITICAL AND CIVIL RIGHTS IN THE UNITED STATES 51-59
(4th ed. 1976).
s" Spence v. Washington, 418 U.S. 405 (1974); see also Smith v. Goguen, 415 U.S. 566
(1974).
s"418 U.S. at 408-9. See Ely, FlagDesecration:A Case Study in the Roles of Categorizationand
Balancing in First Amendment Analysis, 88 HARV. L. REV. 1482, 1483 n.5 (1975).
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decisive, because the flag is a "special kind of personality,"5 2 "a
national property, and the Nation may regulate those who would
make, imitate, sell, possess or use it." 3 In this view, the flag as a
national symbol may be protected against misuse just as the CocaCola insignia as a corporate symbol may be protected against misappropriation. In each instance, there is protection of the intangible
property interest in the integrity of a trademark. Thus, the flag use
case pitted the tangible property interest in private ownership of a
flag against the less tangible interest in public control of the symbol, and the traditional property interest prevailed.54
The potency of the property factor can also be seen in a Burger
Court decision involving the right not to speak, or at least not to
have the state appropriate private property as a forum for the
state's message. The case involved the right of a Jehovah's Witness
to object to the New Hampshire motto, "Live Free or Die," appearing on his automobile license plates. Although the case might have
been decided on the established right of persons of conscience to be
55 the property element was a
free from compelled state orthodoxy,
56
analysis:
key factor in the Court's
We are thus faced with the question of whether the State may
constitutionally require an individual to participate in the dissemination of an ideological message by displaying it on his
private property in a manner and for the express purpose that it
be observed and read by the public. We hold that the State may
not do so....
[The law] in effect requires that appellees use their private property as a "mobile billboard" for the State's ideological message....
The property motifs evident in these cases have been sounded
elsewhere. In one case, the Court invalidated a sweeping local ordi52 418
53

U.S. at 422.
Ibid.

5' This theme of the flag as a national trademark was emphasized by Justice Rehnquist
three months earlier in his dissent in Smith v. Goguen, 415 U.S. at 594.
51 See West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943).
56 Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 713, 715 (1977). In Wooley, the Court relied on an
earlier case holding that a newspaper could not be compelled to use its property to carry a
"reply" message from a political candidate whom the paper had criticized. Miami Herald
Pub. Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241 (1974). And see Abood v. Detroit Board of Education,
431 U.S. 209 (1977). See generally Gaebler, FirstAmendment Protection against Government
Compelled Expression and Association, 23 B.C.L. REV. 995 (1982).
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nance that prohibited drive-in movie theaters with screens visible
from the street from showing scenes of nudity alleged to be offensive to unwilling viewers. 7 The prevailing opinion emphasized that
the speech sought to be regulated emanated from the claimant's
property and that the financial costs that drive-in operators would
have to incur to shield their screens from passersby would be substantial.58
Speech and property were similarly entwined in a 1977 ruling
that a municipality, allegedly attempting to stem "white flight"
from a residential neighborhood, could not ban the posting of "For
Sale" or "Sold" signs on homeowners' property.5 9 While the
Court's strong free speech opinion applied the traditional doctrine
that speech cannot be restricted merely because people may be
stimulated to act, the consequence of the decision was to permit use
of residential property for speech concerning sale of that property.
The Court has also been impressed with speech claims when an
individual or corporation used its funds or property in order to
facilitate the speech. In Buckley v. Valeo, ° the campaign finance
case, the central issue was stated as whether "money is speech,"'"
that is, whether restrictions on the amount of money that could be
spent in political campaigns were restrictions on free speech. Despite powerful countervailing arguments, the Court held that they
were:62 "A restriction on the amount of money a person or group
can spend on political communication during a campaign necessarily reduces the quantity of expression by restricting the number of
issues discussed, the depth of their exploration, and the size of the
audience reached." The Court went on to hold that quantitative
Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205 (1975).
s In Erznoznik, the Court left open the question whether the use of property to show
sexually oriented movies could be regulated through "a properly drawn zoning ordinance
restricting the location of drive-in theaters." 422 U.S. at 212 n.9. A year later, a sharply
divided Court held that municipalities could, as part of a zoning plan, single out "adult only"
bookstores and movie houses and prohibit them from clustering together in the same areas.
Young v. American Mini-Theaters, 427 U.S. 50 (1976). Schad v. Mt. Ephraim, 452 U.S. 61
(198 1), invalidated the application of zoning rules to prohibit "live entertainment," including
nude dancing, in downtown areas. Young was distinguished on the ground that it involved a
comprehensive zoning plan aimed at the problem represented by the particular establishments. See also Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San Diego, 453 U.S. 490 (1981).
"

'9Linmark Associates v. Township of Willingboro, 431 U.S. 85 (1977).
60 424 U.S. 1 (1976).
61 Transcript of Oral Argument, p. 67.
62424 U.S. at 19. Cf. 519 F.2d 821 (D.C. Cir. 1975) (en banc).
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restrictions on how much money candidates, campaigns, or independent supporters could spend violated the First Amendment.
The Court's protection of the overt use of property and economic
resources to facilitate speech was even clearer in a 1978 case where
it protected the free speech rights of entities embodying the quintessential modern form of property: the corporation. 6 3 The Court
held that business corporations cannot be prohibited from spending
corporate funds to express corporate views on referendum issues,
even where those issues do not "materially affect" the corporation's
business or property. Although the Court's analysis emphasized
the importance of public debate and the emerging First Amendment "right to hear," the specific holding was that speech could not
be stripped of First Amendment protection because the source of
the speech was a corporation.6 4 The dissenters believed that a State
may "prevent corporate management from using the corporate treasury to propagate views having no connection with the corporate
business."65

A final example of the Court's willingness to give heightened
protection to speech paid for by the speaker concerned speech by
public utilities-corporate entities traditionally subject to comprehensive state regulation. A New York public service commission
rule barred utility companies from inserting material that expressed
the utility's viewpoint on "controversial matters of public policy" in
monthly billing statements to consumers (in this case, the benefits
66
of nuclear power). The Court invalidated the commission ban.
for corporate
After reaffirming broad First Amendment protections
67
speech, the Court distinguished earlier cases:
63 First National Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765 (1978).

4The main line of cases relied on to uphold restrictions on corporate speech involved
rulings that corporations and labor unions could be wholly barred from engaging in political
campaigns in order "to avoid deleterious influences on federal elections resulting from the use
of money by those who exercise control over large aggregations of capital." United States v.
Automobile Workers, 352 U.S. 567, 585 (1957). See also Pipefitters v. United States, 407
U.S. 385, 415-16 (1972); United States v. CIO, 335 U.S. 106, 113 (1948). Although the
Court indicated that its ruling "implies no comparable right" of corporations or unions to
contribute or to become involved in partisan political campaigns, 435 U.S. at 788 n.26, the
dissenters thought the decision "casts considerable doubt" upon the constitutionality of such
restrictions.
65 435 U.S. at 803.
6 See Consolidated Edison Co. v. Public Service Commission, 447 U.S. 530 (1980).
67 447 U.S. at 539-40 (emphasis added). See Greer v. Spock, 424 U.S. 828 (1976);

Lehman v. Shaker Heights, 418 U.S. 298 (1974).
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Consolidated Edison has not asked to use the offices of the
Commission as a forum from which to promulgate its views.
Rather, it seeks merely to utilize its own billing envelopes to pro-

mulgate its views on controversial issues of public policy ...
[The] Commission's attempt to restrict free expression of a private party cannot be upheld by reliance upon precedent that
rests on the special interests of a government in overseeing the
use of its property.
Once again, the use of property as a platform for speech validates
speech interests.
2. Speech enhanced by property. The corporate and campaign speech
cases reflect another and perhaps more profound property theme in
the Burger Court's decisions: There will be no compelled equalization of the resources to compete in the marketplace of ideas. Time
and again the Court has insisted that government cannot limit the
free speech rights of the wealthy and powerful in order to afford
those with lesser resources the ability to debate on a more equal
footing.
During the 1970s, the Court was confronted with litigants seeking price controls and supports in the marketplace of ideas. One set
of equalization claims came under the rubric of "access to the
media."6 8 In Miami Herald Pub. Co. v. Tornillo,6 9 a candidate for
local elective office invoked a 1902 statute to compel a newspaper
that had criticized him to publish his editorial reply. The Court
sympathetically surveyed the plaintiff's showing that media ownership had become highly concentrated and that the combination of
fewer media outlets and the economic barriers to entry had reduced
participation in public debate and had constricted the scope of
debate. 7O But the Court unanimously rejected an equalizing right -f
1
7

access:

The New York Court of Appeals thereafter held that a utility could, consistent with the
First Amendment, be made to bear the expense of informational advertising, by a commission order excluding such costs from the rate base as an allowable expense and thus requiring
the cost to be subsidized by the shareholders. See Rochester Gas & Electric Corp. v. Public
Service Commission, 51 N.Y.2d 823 (1980), cert. den., 450 U.S. 961 (1981).
"' See generally Barron, Access to thePress-aNew First Amendment Right, 80 HARV. L.
REV. 1641 (1967); ScHMIDT, FREEDOM OF THE PRESS v. PUBLIC AccEss (1976).
6"418 U.S. 241 (1974).
70Id. at 247-54.
7,Id. at 254. See also CBS, Inc. v. Democratic National Committee, 412 U.S. 94 (1973);
but cf CBS, Inc. v. FCC, 453 U.S. 367 (1981).
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. [A]t each point the implementation of a remedy such as an

enforceable right of access necessarily calls for some mechanism,
either governmental or consensual. If it is governmental coercion, this at once brings about a confrontation with the express
provisions of the First Amendment.
One might discount this decision on the ground that it reflected a
special solicitude for the press. But Tornillo previewed the more
sweeping issues that surfaced two years later in Buckley v. Valeo.
The plaintiffs had challenged new statutory restrictions on contributions to federal candidates and expenditures by federal candidates, their campaigns and their independent supporters. The governmental interests alleged to sustain these restrictions were
prevention of corruption through unlimited contributions, as symbolized by Watergate, equalization of the ability to compete in the
political marketplace, and prevention of "skyrocketing" campaign
expenditures. 72 Concluding that the restrictions were consonant
with the First Amendment, the District of Columbia Court of
Appeals upheld the monetary restrictions in their entirety.7 3
The Supreme Court reversed much of the decision below in an
opinion characterized as the "key to understanding the Burger
Court's protection of speech connected to economic activity." 74 Initially, the Court rejected the global theory that the application of
wealth to subsidize political speech constituted regulable "conduct"
75
rather than speech, or could be subjected to "volume" restraints:
"A restriction on the amount of money a person or group can spend
...

necessarily reduces the quantity of expression by restricting the

number of issues discussed, the depth of their exploration, and the
size of the audience reached." It then turned to particular restraints. After upholding some contribution limitations on anticor-

72 424

U.S. at 55-57.

73 519 F.2d 817 (D.C. Cir. 1975) (per curiam, en banc).
74 Nowak, note 41 supra, at 309. Nowak observed that the statutory limitations on campaign expenditures "were based on Congressional adoption of a philosophy like that of
Rawls, which required equalized political voices to protect the principles of the social compact." Id. at 309. See also Nicholson, Buckley v. Valeo: The Constitutionalityof the Federal
Election CampaignAct Amendments of 1974, 1977 Wis. L. REv. 323; Wright, Money and the
Pollution of Politics: Is the First Amendment an Obstacle to Equality? 82 COLUM. L. REv. 609
(1982).
75 424 U.S. at 15-19.
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ruption grounds,7 6 the Court sharply rejected the power of government to restrict expenditures by wealthy speakers in order to
enhance the voice of others:7 7 "[T]he concept that government may
restrict the speech of some elements of our society in order to
enhance the relative voice of others is wholly foreign to the First
Amendment."
Finally, the Court struck down the ceilings on overall expenditures in a campaign by observing categorically that:7"
The First Amendment denies government the power to determine that spending to promote one's political views is wasteful,
excessive, or unwise. In the free society ordained by our Constitution it is not the government, but the people-individually
as citizens and candidates and collectively as associations and
political committees-who must retain control over the quantity
and range of debate on public issues in a political campaign.
Those whose personal wealth and property permit them a greater
opportunity to speak on partisan campaign issues cannot be restricted from doing so in the interests of equality. The decision thus
stands as a potent example of wealth and speech uniting to defeat
claims based on an equality principle.7 9
The link between property and speech and the refusal to tolerate
legislative efforts to "equalize" public discourse by reducing
wealth-based differences in the ability to enter the marketplace of
ideas were again evident in Bellotti. The step from the campaign
finance case to the corporate speech case was short in doctrine but
long in implication. The issue was whether corporations could be
prohibited by statute from spending funds to influence the electorate on a referendum question "other than one materially affecting
any of the property, business or assets of the corporation. 0 The
76 Id. at 24-29. The Court found that the contribution limits served the compelling

interest of preventing the potential and appearance of political corruption associated with
unlimited private campaign contributions and that these interests were sufficient to overcome
the speech and associational rights implicit in making contributions to candidates.
77Id.
78 Id.

at 48-49, 54.
at 57.

79Two recent cases under the federal campaign finance laws have generally hewn to the
Buckley approach. See California Medical Ass'n v. Federal Election Commission, 453 U.S.
182 (1981); Federal Election Commission v. Democratic Senatorial Campaign Committee,
102 S. Ct. 38 (1981).
80 435 U.S. at 785.
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highest Massachusetts court upheld the restriction on the ground
that a corporation's right to speak was a function of-and therefore
limited by-its right to protect its property and that the statute
allowed corporate speech on issues that affected its economic and
property interest.
A sharply divided Supreme Court reversed. Justice Powell's
opinion for the Court framed the issue as "whether the corporate
identity of the speaker deprives this proposed speech of what otherwise would be its clear entitlement to protection. '"' The Court
found that the limitation on corporate speech infringed two First
Amendment concerns: (1) prohibiting government from "limiting
the stock of information" available to the public and (2) disqualifying government from "dictating the subjects about which persons
may speak and the speakers who may address a public issue. 8 2 The
claims that corporate wealth, capital, and power would "drown
out" other points of view and exert an undue influence on referendum campaigns were rejected with the observation that there had
been no record showing to that effect. More significantly, the Court
once again rejected the "concept that government may restrict the
speech of some elements of our society in order to enhance the
relative voice of others."8 3
It is difficult to avoid viewing Bellotti as a Magna Carta for corporate speech on public issues. Taken in tandem with Buckley v. Valeo,
it provides a broad basis for individuals and corporations to employ
aggregations of wealth and property to influence the citizenry on
public issues, public questions, and perhaps even candidates for
public office. The Court rejected the effort to equalize the debate.84
8'Id. at 778.
82 Id. at 783, 785.
83 Id. at 790-91. The Court did not foreclose the possibility of a different result where
there were "record or legislative findings that corporate advocacy threatened imminently to
undermine democratic processes, thereby denigrating rather than serving First Amendment
interests. . . "Id. at 789. But such a showing may be difficult to make. Cf. Citizens Against
Rent Control v. City of Berkeley, 102 S.Ct. 434 (1981). See generally Chevigny, Philosophy of
Language and Free Expression, 55 N.Y.U.L. REV. 157 (1980).
84 It might be suggested that Bellotti should be viewed as a "right to hear" case, reflecting

the revival of that free speech interest in the commercial speech cases. But the Court's
recognition of a "right to hear" as a discrete First Amendment component has been less than
consistent. Compare, e.g., Gannett Co. v. De Pasquale, 443 U.S. 368, 391-93 (1979), with,
e.g., Richmond Newspapers v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 576 (1980); Globe Newspaper Co. v.
Superior Court, 102 S. Ct. 2613 (1982). For an incisive analysis of Bellotti, see Ratner,
Corporationsand the Constitution, 15 U.S.F.L. REV. 11 (1981).
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3. Speech promoting property. The Burger Court's principal First
Amendment innovation has been to incorporate "commercial
speech" within the zone of protected speech and, in less than a
decade, elaborate an entire doctrine for this purpose. It has done so
by explicit reliance on traditional free market models linking the
protection of free enterprise and economic interests with the protection of speech. "The relationship of speech to the marketplace of
products or of services does not make it valueless in the marketplace
of ideas."ss
In 1942 the Court held that "the Constitution imposes no...
restraint on government as respects purely commercial advertising."8 6 Although this doctrine was subsequently limited,87 not until
1975 did the Court rule, in the context of advertising of abortion
services, that "commercial" speech merited some constitutional
protection, the precise extent depending on whether the public
88
interest in the speech outweighed the state's need for regulation.
A year later the Court revised its doctrine by holding that speech
which does "no more than propose a commercial transaction" cannot for that reason alone be denied First Amendment protection.89
The case involved a statutory restriction on price advertising of
prescription drugs, where the content of the prohibited message"I will sell you the X prescription drug at the Y price"-was
wholly commercial. The Court rested on three grounds: (1) speech
does not lose its protection because it is paid for by the advertiser or
flows from an economic motivation; (2) individuals and society have
a strong interest in "the free flow of commercial information"; and
(3) commercial advertising is indispensable in our "predominantly
free enterprise economy." The Court nevertheless disclaimed any
suggestion that commercial speech would be as immune from regu"' Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 809, 826 (1975).
16 Valentine v. Chrestensen, 316 U.S. 52, 54 (1942).
17Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Commission on Human Relations, 413 U.S. 376 (1973).
" Bigelow v. Virginia, note 85 supra. The case involved a Virginia statutory prohibition
on "encouraging... the procuring of abortion. . ." applied to the editor of a local weekly
newspaper that had run an advertisement for lawful abortion services available in New York.
Because the information was of arguable public interest, the Court did not have to address
squarely the "purely commercial speech" issues. Two years earlier, in PittsburghPress, the
Court did not cast doubt on the continued vitality of the commercial speech exception where
an illegal commercial proposal was concerned.
"' Virginia State Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S.
748 (1976).
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lation as other more "protected" forms of speech or that the "commonsense" differences between commercial speech and other forms
of speech could not be taken into account in justifying differing
kinds of government regulations. 9 °
The Court soon extended the protection of commercial speech to
"For Sale" signs to sell private homes, 91 to advertisements for contraceptives, 9 2 and to advertising of low-cost legal services. 93 These
cases made clear that Virginia Board was to be a powerful precedent
for protecting speech promoting goods and services. But they also
demonstrated that the "commonsense" distinctions between commercial and political speech had teeth. Such distinctions differentiated the letter solicitation of clients for public interest litigation
by ACLU lawyers9 4 from in-person solicitation of clients in commonplace personal injury cases. 95 A year later similar distinctions
supplied the basis for upholding a Texas statute that, in the interest
of avoiding potential consumer deception as to the quality of ser96
vices, prohibited the practice of optometry under a trade name.
The Court revisited these doctrinal problems and reformulated the
rules governing commercial speech in a 1980 ruling invalidating a
New York Public Service Commission order prohibiting regulated
electric utilities from "promoting the use of electricity through...
advertising."9 7
It has been argued that speech proceeding from economic and
profit motives is too remote from the First Amendment values of
self-expression and self-governance to warrant protection and that
0 Id. at 770-72. Justice Rehnquist, the sole dissenter, took sharp issue with "elevat[ing]
commercial intercourse between a seller hawking his wares and a buyer seeking to strike a
bargain to the same plane as has been previously reserved for the free marketplace of ideas."
Id. at 781. He also rejected the consumerist perspective on the Court's opinion, insisting that
the First Amendment's primary function is to facilitate public decisionmaking in a democracy, not to facilitate "the choice of shampoo." Id. at 787.
"' Linmark Associates, Inc. v. Township of Willingboro, 431 U.S. 85 (1977).
92 Carey v. Population Services Int'l, 431 U.S. 678 (1977).
9" Bates v. State Bar of Arizona, 433 U.S. 350 (1977). See In re R.M.J., 102 S. Ct. 929
(1982).
94 In re Primus, 436 U.S. 412 (1978).
9s Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S. 447 (1978).
9 Friedman v. Rogers, 440 U.S. 1 (1979). Justice Powell observed for the Court that "a
property interest in a means of communication does not enlarge or diminish the First
Amendment protection of that communication." Id. at 12 n. 11.
97 Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. Public Service Commission, 447 U.S. 557, 566
(1980).
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these decisions can only be justified in terms of economic liberty
values of the Lochner genre.9 8 This is a doubtful conclusion. Although the commercial speech doctrine primarily provides succor
to economic interests, it is consistent with at least some of the
purposes of the First Amendment. Commercial speech provides
information of value to private consumers and affects public economic activity. However one resolves the dispute, it is plain that
the Burger Court, through the use of the First Amendment, is
producing results consonant with free market competition and the
maintenance of property values.9 9
4. Speech and media 'property." The Burger Court's linkage of
property rights and speech protection is also reflected in a series of
cases that permit owners of mass media to use "their" property for
whatever speech they prefer and to refuse access to those who
would use their facilities for contrary messages. The cases tend to
that "Freedom of the press belongs
confirm A. J. Liebling's remark
10 0
to those who own one."
The Supreme Court's initial encounter with the issue came in
1969 in Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC,'° ' where it upheld the
personal attack and political editorial branches of the fairness doctrine and thus sustained a narrow form of compelled access to
electronic news media. At issue was the broadcasters' asserted First
Amendment right to use their allotted frequencies "to broadcast
whatever they choose, and to exclude whomever they choose from
ever using that frequency. ' 02 A unanimous Court rejected the
98"See, e.g., Baker, Commercial Speech: A Problemin the Theory of Freedom, 62 IOWA L. REV. 1
(1976); Jackson & Jeffries, Commercial Speech: Economic Due Processand the FirstAmendment, 65
VA. L. REV. 1 (1979); Farber, Commercial Speech and FirstAmendment Theory, 74 Nw. U.L.
REV. 372 (1979); but see Roberts, Toward a General Theory of Commercial Speech and the First
Amendment, 40 OHIO ST. L.J. 115 (1979); see generally, Symposium, Commercial Speech, 46
BROOKLiN L. REv. 389; Note, ConstitutionalProtection of Commercial Speech, 82 COLUM. L.
REV. 720 (1982).
99 Professor Farber, note 98 supra, suggests that a commercial message can be broken down
into two components: informational and contractual. Where government is seeking to regulate the former, normal First Amendment doctrines are applicable to assess the restriction.
Where the regulation is aimed at the contractual component of the message, even though
words are used in the transaction, government's broad power to regulate breaches of contract
and warranty comes into play. In this view, a false advertisement can be regulated not
because it is "bad" speech, but because it is like a breach of warranty. The equation is not
easily made.
,c Quoted in LIEBEILMAN, FREE SPEECH, FREE PRESS, AND THE LAW 121 (1980).

,o1 395 U.S. 367 (1969).
Id. at 386.
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argument, relying on two grounds to uphold limited incursions on
broadcasters' rights. First, the Court found that the fairness doctrine advanced the free speech values of "an uninhibited marketplace of ideas in which truth will ultimately prevail," as opposed to
permitting "monopolization of that market."' 1 3 That view plainly
prefers speech values over the combined property and speech interests of broadcasters. But the Court found it necessary to express a
second reason for the fairness doctrine based on a competing "property" interest, public "ownership" of the airwaves: "the First
Amendment confers ... no right to an unconditional monopoly of
a scarce resource which the Government has denied others the right
to use. . . . Licenses to broadcast do not confer ownership of
designated frequencies, but only the temporary privilege of using
them."'0 4 Thus, although Red Lion in fact subordinated broadcasters' property rights to First Amendment claims, the Court employed a property metaphor in the form of the public's superior
10 5
title to the airwaves.
The Burger Court's first encounter with these issues came in
Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc. v. Democratic National Committee, 10 6 where it sharply limited Red Lion by upholding the right of
broadcasters to refuse to accept paid public issue advertisements.
Chief Justice Berger's opinion, although noting that the broadcast
media "utilize a valuable and limited public resource," found broad
107
Congressional intent to uphold the prerogatives of media owners:
. . . Congress opted for a system of private broadcasters
licensed and regulated by Government .... [T]his, choice was
influenced not only by traditional attitudes toward private enterprise, but by a desire to maintain for licensees, so far as consistent with necessary regulation, a traditional journalistic role.
Thus, principles of journalistic freedom, augmented by congressionally sanctioned concepts of private ownership of broadcast outlets, resulted in protection of the private broadcasters' prerogatives.
'03 Id. at 390.
'04Id. at 391, 394.
15 In unanimously rejecting a similar fairness and access claim against privately owned

print media, with no comparable public media "ownership" interests affecting the balance,
the Court did not even cite Red Lion. See Miami Herald Pub. Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241
(1974).
106 412 U.S. 94 (1973).
107 Id. at 116.
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Abuses could be controlled through the fairness doctrine and the
08
license renewal system.'
The broadest protection for the journalistic and entrepreneurial
freedom of media owners, and the sharpest rejection of access
claims, came in Miami Herald Pub. Co. v. Tornillo.109 The Court
unanimously overturned a limited statutory form of compelled access by political candidates seeking equal space to reply to personal
attacks, notwithstanding a powerful demonstration that "economic
factors" have resulted in the concentration of media ownership "in a
few hands [with] the power to inform the American people and
shape public opinion."" 0 Despite the "monopoly of the means of
communication," the Court held that any effort to remedy the
problem inevitably entailed either government controls or selfcensorship, both of which were anathema to free press values."'
Once again, the First Amendment interests of those whose ownership enhanced their right to speak were to prevail. Compelled
access to the pages of their newspapers would not be permitted. 112
Two cases decided in the 1980 Term reaffirmed the Court's
protection of media owners against broad access claims, although in
one of these cases it recognized a limited right of access. In the first
case a radio station with a particular program format of classical
music was sold to a new licensee who planned to change to "popular" musical fare. Access advocates challenged the sale, claiming
that the Commission had to take account of the diminution of
programming diversity in deciding whether to allow it. The Commission disagreed, reasoning that "market forces" would insure
diversity more effectively than "government intervention." The
Supreme Court rejected the access claims and upheld the Commis,o'
The Court did observe one flaw in the proposed access scheme for the mandated right
to purchase air time for editorial messages: that the statutory public interest standard "would
scarcely be served by a system so heavily weighted in favor of the financially affluent, or
those with access to wealth.... Even under a first-come-first-served system,... the views of

the affluent could well prevail over those of others, since they would have it within their
power to purchase time more frequently." Id. at 123.
'09 418 U.S. 241 (1974).
"o Id. at 249-50.
...
Id. at 254-58.
112 In FCC v. Midwest Video Corp., 440 U.S. 689 (1979), the Court held that the FCC
had exceeded its statutory authority to regulate cable television in promulgating "public
access" rules that required cable television operators to set aside a number of cable channels
for public use.
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sion's policy as consistent with the statute and First Amendment
values." 3 The effect of the ruling was a victory for the journalistic
and property interests of station owners.
The second decision tested a federal campaign reform statute
providing that candidates for federal elective office have a right of
reasonable access to the use of stations for paid political broadcasts
on behalf of their candidacies." 4 The statute was challenged by the
three major networks, which had refused, in late 1979, to make
airtime available to President Carter's 1980 reelection campaign.
The lower court upheld the statute, and the Supreme Court
affirmed." 1 Chief Justice Burger's opinion concentrated on
whether Congress had intended to create such a limited right of
access and whether the Commission could manageably enforce the
requirement. With respect to the broadcaster's First Amendment
objections, the Chief Justice acknowledged the tension between
journalistic freedom and public control of the airwaves but resolved
of campaign speech
the conflict by concluding that the facilitating
1 16
justified the limited right of access:
Petitioners are correct that the Court has never approved a
general right of access to the media. [Citations omitted.] Nor do
we do so today. Section 312(a)(7) creates a limited right to "reasonable" access that pertains only to legally qualified federal
candidates....
Section 312(a)(7) represents an effort by Congress to assure
that an important resource-the airwaves-will be used in the
public interest. We hold that the statutory right of access...
properly balances the First Amendment rights of federal candidates, the public, and broadcasters.
This CBS case hews more closely to Red Lion than it does to the
first CBS decision. In order to enhance campaign speech, it permits
a limited incursion on broadcasters' interests that it justifies by
reference to public "ownership" of "an important resource." On the
to access will be limited to candiother hand, the "limited"1 right
17
dates who can pay for it.
"' FCC v. WNCN Listeners Guild, 450 U.S. 582 (1981).
114 47 U.S.C. §312(a)(7) (1971).
"l CBS, Inc. v. FCC, 453 U.S. 367 (1981).
Id. at 396-97 (emphasis in original).
The other instance where the Burger Court allowed some government intrusion upon
the property and speech interests of media owners was the 1978 decision upholding FCC
"cross-ownership" rules generally prohibiting formation of jointly owned newspaper116
117
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What emerges is that both the First Amendment and property
rights that attach to media ownership will generally prevail over
broad access and diversity claims. Print media owners cannot be
compelled to supply access. In limited instances, electronic media
owners are subject to compelled access in a narrow and discrete
fashion by virtue of overriding public "ownership" interests.
B. PROPERTY AND SPEECH IN CONFLICT

1. Speech and the 'publicforum." The Court's "public forum" cases
supply the most powerful example of a tension between speech
rights and property rights. The Burger Court, expressly overruling
Warren Court precedent, has held that the First Amendment does
not require that facilities open to the public generally must allow
speech activity over the objections of the owner-private, corporate, or governmental.
The use of public and private property for First Amendment
activities inevitably involves an adjustment of property rights and
speech interests. Almost a century ago, Justice Holmes took the
position in Massachusetts that property rights would invariably
prevail:' "For the Legislature absolutely or conditionally to forbid
public speaking in a highway or public park is no more an infringement of the rights of a member of the public than for the owner of a
private house to forbid it in his house." A different view was taken
by Justice Roberts in his oft-cited opinion in Hague v. CIO: 119
"Wherever the title of the streets and parks may rest, they have
immemorially been held in trust for the use of the public and, time
out of mind, have been used for purposes of assembly, communicating thoughts between citizens, and discussing public questions." The Burger Court's adjustment of the interests gives primary weight to property.
a) Privateproperty. In Marsh v. Alabama,120 the Court held in 1946
that corporate ownership of legal title to a "company town" could
not override the public's interest "in the functioning of the commubroadcast outlet combinations in the same locality and requiring divestiture of certain existing combinations. FCC v. National Citizens Committee for Broadcasting, 436 U.S. 775
(1978). See generally Lee, Antitrust Enforcement, Freedom of the Press, and the "Open Market":
The Supreme Court on the Structure and Conduct of Mass Media, 32 VAND. L. REv. 1249 (1979).
"" 162 Mass. 510, 511 (1895), aj'd, 167 U.S. 43 (1897).
"9 307 U.S. 496, 515 (1939) (concurring opinion).
12o

326 U.S. 501, 507 (1964).
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nity in such a manner that the channels of communication remain
free." The decision overturned the conviction of a Jehovah's
Witness for handing out literature on the streets of Chickasaw,
Alabama, a community whose buildings and streets were owned by
a private corporation. Finding that the town resembled a typical
municipality in every way but ownership, the Court held that the
121
property factor should not control:
Ownership does not always mean absolute dominion. The
more an owner, for his advantage, opens up his property for use
by the public in general, the more do his rights become circumscribed by the statutory and constitutional rights of those
who use it...
When we balance the Constitutional rights of owners of property against those of the people to enjoy freedom of the press and
religion, as we must here, we remain mindful of the fact that the
latter occupy a preferred position .... [T]he circumstance that
the property rights to the premises where the deprivation of
liberty, here involved, took place, were held by others than the
public, is not sufficient to justify the State's permitting a corporation to govern a community of citizens so as to restrict their
fundamental liberties...
Justice Frankfurter's concurring opinion added: "Title to property
as defined by State law controls property relations; it cannot control issues of civil liberties which arise precisely because a company
town is a town as well as a congeries of property relations. )122
In 1968, the Warren Court significantly extended Marsh by holding that a state court injunction which prohibited peaceful labor
picketers from entering the property of a privately owned shopping
center in order to protest the labor policies of a store located in that
center violated the First Amendment. 123 The injunction barred the
demonstrators from trespassing on shopping center property and
relegated them to a public roadway at the entrance to the center
parking lot several hundred feet from the supermarket.
Starting from the premise that "peaceful picketing carried on in a
location generally open to the public" is presumptively protected
121 Id.

at 506, 509.

Id. at 511. On the same day, the Court invalidated a similar conviction for distributing
literature in a company town owned and controlled by the federal government. Tucker v.
Texas, 326 U.S. 517 (1946).
123 Amalgamated Food Employees Union v. Logan Valley Plaza, 391 U.S. 308 (1968).
122
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by the First Amendment, the Court characterized the issue
"squarely" presented as "whethdr Pennsylvania's generally valid
rules against trespass to private property" could be applied to bar
labor picketing of a store in a shopping center. 124 The Court held
they could not. The most striking part of the Court's opinion was
its rejection of the shopping center's claimed traditional right to
exclude from private property, a right "part and parcel of the rights
125
traditionally associated with ownership of private property."'
Given the contemporary development of shopping centers as the
"functional equivalent" of downtown business districts, the Court
concluded that the Marsh principles, that ownership does not "always mean absolute dominion" and that the rights of an owner who
opens property to the public can be circumscribed, compelled a
reversal of the injunction.' 2 6 The shopping center case, taken together with Red Lion decided the following year, represented the
high point for First Amendment access advocates.
The Burger Court's reversal of this momentum began in 1972 in
Lloyd Corp. v. Tanner.127 Responding to property rights arguments,
Justice Powell wrote that depriving the private owner of a shopping
mall of the right to exclude from its premises people who wished to
distribute antiwar leaflets was a violation of the owner's rights to
128
private property and one not required by the First Amendment:
"[T]here has been no such dedication of Lloyd's privately owned
and operated shopping center to public use as to entitle respondents
to exercise therein the asserted First Amendment rights." The record showed that the mall was open to all members of the public,
that space in the mall had frequently been made available to civic
groups, and that the land upon which the mall was built had originally been publicly owned. Nevertheless, in an elaborate explication of the clash between free speech rights and property interests,
the Court found that Marsh and Logan Valley were not controlling.
As time would prove, the grounds upon which those cases were

'

24

Id. at 315.

12SId. at 319.

,26Id. at 324-25. Justice Black dissented in Logan Valley Plazaon the ground that "whether
this Court likes it or not, the Constitution recognizes and supports the concept of private
ownership of property." Id.at 330.
127407 U.S. 551 (1972).
128 Id. at 570.
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distinguished were unpersuasive and contained the seeds of the
overruling of Logan Valley.
In his Lloyd opinion Justice Powell insisted that Logan Valley was
wrong in treating a shopping center as the "functional equivalent"
of a municipal business district, since the "invitation extended to
the public . . is to come to the Center to do business with the
tenants," and not an "open-ended invitation to the public to use the
Center for any and all purposes.
"129 In addition, he maintained
that Logan Valley could be limited to situations where the First
Amendment message was related to an activity at the shopping
center because "[i]t would be an unwarranted infringement of property rights to require them to yield to the exercise of First Amendment rights under circumstances where adequate alternative avenues of communication exist."'130
Finally, the Court addressed the conflict between property inter131 .
ests and speech rights on a broader plane:
[T]his Court has never held that a trespasser or an uninvited
guest may exercise general rights of free speech on property
privately owned and used nondiscriminatorily for private purposes only. Even where public property is involved, the Court
has recognized that it is not necessarily available for speech,
pickets, or other communicative activity...
When one compares these observations with the statement in Marsh
that judicial balancing of property rights against First Amendment
rights must be "mindful of the fact that the latter occupy a preferred position,, 132 it becomes clear that the priority of speech over
property had yielded to a parity between
speech and property, if
1 33
not a new preference for the latter.
129 Id. at 564-65. Thus the Court employed a subject-matter basis for differentiating Lloyd
from Logan Valley, even though less than one week later the Court would observe that
"above all else, the First Amendment means that government has no right to restrict
expression because of its message, its ideas, its subject matter, or its content." Police
Department of Chicago v. Moseley, 408 U.S. 92, 95 (1972).
130 407 U.S. at 567. This ground of distinction also contravened settled doctrine: "... one
is not to have the exercise of his liberty of expression in appropriate places abridged on the
plea that it may be exercised in some other place." Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147, 163
(1939).
131

Id. at 568-70.

132 326 U.S. at 509.

1 See 407 U.S. at 580 (Marshall, J., dissenting). Similar issues were similarly resolved
the same day in Central Hardware Co. v. NLRB, 407 U.S. 539, 543 (1972).
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Four years later, the preference for property rights over speech
rights was again evident in Hudgens v. NLRB. 34
' Eschewing pretense
of distinguishing Logan Valley by expressly overruling it and
confining Marsh to its facts, the Court held that the First Amendment had no role to play in determining whether union picketers
had a right of speech access to privately owned shopping centers.
Viewing the issue and the precedents through the prism of the state
action requirement, the Court reasoned that while Marsh was still
sound-since the "company town" was more town than company-Logan Valley was out of line in treating the privately owned
shopping center as the "functional equivalent" of a business district. "' Accordingly, the only rights which the union speakers had
were those made available by statute.
In dissent, Justice Marshall, joined by Justice Brennan, sharply
criticized the Court's property-based approach to the issues and its
gratuitous "bypassing of [a] purely statutory issue to overrule a
First Amendment decision less than 10 years old."' 36 He argued
that "courts ought not let the formalities of title put an end to
analysis": the important point, underlying Marsh, was that "traditional public channels of communication remain free, regardless of
the incidence of ownership."' 37 The dissent concluded: 3 8
In the final analysis, the Court's rejection of any role for the
First Amendment in the privately owned shopping center complex stems, I believe, from an overly formalistic view of the
relationship between the institution of private ownership of
property and the First Amendment's guarantee of freedom of
speech. No one would seriously question the legitimacy of the
values of privacy and individual autonomy traditionally associated with privately owned property. But property that is privately owned is not always held for private use, and when a
property owner opens his property to public use the force of
those values diminishes.
The next decision in the line had an ironic twist, with the Court's
114 424 U.S. 507 (1976).

"'Id. at 520-21.
336Id. at
137

532.
Id. at 538, 539.

"3 Id. at 542-43. For decisions involving statutory claims by employees to use employers'
property for union activity, see Beth Israel Hospital v. NLRB, 437 U.S. 483 (1978); Eastex,
Inc. v. NLRB, 437 U.S. 556 (1978); NLRB v. Baptist Hospital, 442 U.S. 773 (1979).

224

THE SUPREME COURT REVIEW

[1982

1980 ruling in PruneYard Shopping Center v. Robins. 139 The case involved an attempt by a political group to solicit petition signatures
at a California shopping center, privately owned but open to the
general public. The owners prohibited all such activity at the shopping center. Blocked by Lloyd's overruling of Logan Valley from
asserting a First Amendment right of access, the group persuaded
the California Supreme Court that the state constitution's guarantee of "liberty of speech," coupled with the state's police power to
regulate private property in the public interest, required a rule
permitting access to shopping centers to vindicate state-created free
speech rights."
The Supreme Court, speaking through Justice Rehnquist, unanimously affirmed. The Court ruled that the State restriction of
property rights in favor of state-recognized free speech rights did
not deprive the shopping center owner of federally protected property rights. The Court treated Lloyd Corp. v. Tanner, whose continuing validity was not questioned, as having protected private
property rights against a First Amendment right of access. But that
the state's general police power to regulate
decision did not limit
14 1
property rights:
In Lloyd there was no state constitutional or statutory provision that had been construed to create rights to the use of private
property by strangers, comparable to those found by the California Supreme Court here. It is, of course, well-established that a
State in the exercise of its police power may adopt reasonable
restrictions on private property so long as the restrictions do not
amount to a taking without just compensation or contravene any
other federal constitutional provision.
Having concluded that Lloyd was not controlling, the Court addressed the shopping center's claims that the state restriction of its
right to exclude speakers from its premises constituted a "taking" of
its property without just compensation and "deprived" it of property without due process of law. Justice Rehnquist observed that
"one of the essential sticks in the bundle of property rights is the
right to exclude others,"' 4 2 and agreed that there had been such a
74 (1980).
23 Cal.3d 899 (1979).
141447 U.S. at 81.
142Id. at 82.
"9 447 U.S.
'40
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"taking" by the recognition of a state right to engage in free speech
on shopping center property over the owner's objections. But this
was not a violation of the Fifth Amendment's Takings Clause, as
traditionally interpreted, because it did not "unreasonably impair
the value or use" of the property as a shopping center or interfere
with "reasonable investment-backed expectations." 14' 3 In addition,
the Court found no deprivation of general property rights, given
the broad state authority to define and reorder such rights."
At first glance, the shopping center case would appear to confound the thesis that the Burger Court has preferred property
rights over free speech interests. On closer examination the decision does not sustain this view.
The Court left undisturbed its holding in Lloyd that First
Amendment rights of access to private property will be wholly
subordinated to state-sanctioned rights to exclude. Except where a
State has chosen, as California did, to withdraw the right to ex' Had
clude from the bundle of property rights, Lloyd will control. 45
the Court reversed the California court's restriction of the shopping
center's right to exclude, it would have had to employ the Due
Process Clause to place severe limits on the State's ability to define
and condition property rights. Such a ruling would have altered
settled doctrine governing the state's police power to regulate property rights and possibly invited a return to the discredited "Lochner
era." 146
'43

Id. at 83.

4 Id. at 85-88. The Court distinguished Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705 (1977), the
license plate motto case, by reasoning that, unlike the automobile registrant,- the shopping
center owner had opened his property to the public generally, was not being compelled to
crry a specific, state-mandated message on his property, would not be identified with the
views expressed by the speakers, and could easily and expressly disavow any connection
with or support for the message. Miami Herald Pub. Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241 (1974)
was held inapposite as an editorial discretion case. See generally Gaebler, note 5 supra.
141 Justice Marshall, the author of the Warren Court's Logan Valley decision, reiterated his

objection to the Court's approach. Id. at 91.
146 Some members of the Court have hurled the Lochner charge at decisions revitalizing
the Contract Clause. See United States Trust Co. v. NewJersey, 431 U.S. 1, 60-61 (1977)

(Brennan, J., dissenting); Allied Structural Steel Co. v. Spannaus, 438 U.S. 234, 259-62
(1978) (Brennan, J., dissenting). But the Court has not evinced an inclination to return to
Locbner. See, e.g., Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery Co., 449 U.S. 456 (1981). See Bishop
v. Wood, 426 U.S. 341 (1976); Flagg Bros. Inc. v. Brooks, 436 U.S. 149 (1978); Penn Central
Transportation Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104(1978); Agins v. Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255
(1980); Texaco, Inc. v. Short, 102 S. Ct. 781 (1982). Cf Hodel v. Virginia Surface
Mining and Reclamation Ass'n, Inc., 452 U.S. 264(1981); Doniovn v. Dewey, 452 U.S. 594
(1981).
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In short, the Court's PruneYard decision did not prefer First
Amendment rights at the expense of property rights. It upheld the
expansive power of states to define, expand, or contract property
rights.
The Princeton University case, had it not been mooted, 147 would
have permitted the Supreme Court to test the reach of PruneYard.
In PruneYard the state law readjustment of property rights was
targeted, in a civil proceeding, on a traditional commercial enterprise which advanced no strong First Amendment interests of its
own. In the Princeton case, state criminal law was applied to property owned by a private educational institution claiming both property and speech rights in controlling its premises. In such circumstances, following the Hudgens theory, the balance might tilt against
allowance of a free speech easement for demonstrators. That was
certainly the thrust of the Loretto decision, 148 where the Court upheld the rights of landlords to refuse to allow cable television wires
to be installed on their property for tenants' use. In finding a "taking" by virtue of "a permanent physical occupation of real property," the Court again manifested its inclination to protect property
rights against speech-related claims.
b) "Public"property. Just as Marsh v. Alabama is the baseline to
examine speech rights on private property, Justice Robert's plurality opinion in Hague v. CIO is the standard to measure speech rights
on publicly owned property. Rejecting a property-centered conception of the First Amendment, he said: "Wherever the title of
streets and parks may rest, they have immemorially been held in
trust for the use of the public and, time out of mind, have been used
for purposes of assembly, communicating thoughts between citizens, and discussing public questions."' 4 9 The Warren Court was
generous in applying this principle to invalidate government restrictions on the use of streets and other public places for First
Amendment purposes, including demonstrations before a State
House,' 50 the home of a mayor,' 5 ' and an Army recruiting
station. 152
i47See text supra at notes 12-17.
148 See

text supra at notes 18-20.

'49

307 U.S. at 515.

150

Edwards v. South Carolina, 372 U.S. 229 (1963).

151 Gregory v. City of Chicago, 394 U.S. I1
152Bachellar

(1969).
v. Maryland, 397 U.S. 564 (1970).
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These decisions reflect the tension between two approaches to
free speech use of publicly owned property. Either government
premises open to the public are appropriate forums for speech activity which does not interfere with the functioning of the facility
or government may control its property in the same fashion as a
private owner to exclude those who would enter for speech activity.
The speech-protective approach was demonstrated in Brown v.
Louisiana,'" where the Court overturned a breach of the peace
conviction of five young black protesters who conducted a silent
vigil inside a segregated public library. Justice Fortas found that
First Amendment freedoms included "the right in a peaceable and
orderly manner to protest by silent and reproachful presence, in a
place where the protestant has every right to be, the unconstitutional segregation of public facilities."' 5 4 Justice Black's sharp dissent made the contrary point: "[The First Amendment] does not
guarantee to any person the right to use someone else's property,
even that owned by government and dedicated to other purposes,
as a stage to express dissident ideas." ' Just a few months later,
Justice Black's property views prevailed in a case upholding trespass convictions of civil rights protesters for gathering outside a jail,
but upon jail premises.5 6 In rejecting the First Amendment claim,
Justice Black insisted:1
The State, no less than a private owner of property, has power
to preserve the property under its control for the use to which it
is lawfully dedicated. For this reason, there is no merit to the
petitioners' argument that they had a constitutional right to stay
on the property, over the jail custodian's objections, because this
"area chosen for the peaceful civil rights demonstration was not
only 'reasonable' but also particularly appropriate."
Since the Warren Court was sharply divided in both cases, the
Burger Court was free from precedential restraint in determining
its approach to governmental control of speech uses of public property. The initial results were inconclusive.
In a 1974 case, Lehman v. City of Shaker Heights,'5 7 the Court split
over whether a municipally owned and operated bus company
1

383 U.S. 131 (1966).

Id. at 142.
,S' Id. at 166.
114

156

Adderley v. Florida, 385 U.S. 39, 47 (1966).

' 418 U.S. 298 (1974).
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could refuse to accept political advertisements on city-owned buses
while allowing commercial messages to be displayed. Justice Blackmun's plurality opinion, finding that no public forum for ideas had
been created, 8characterized the city as acting like a private
5
entrepreneur: 1
[The city is engaged in commerce ....The car card space... is
a part of the commercial venture. . . .No First Amendment
forum is here to be found. The city consciously has limited
access to its transit system advertising space in order to minimize
chances of abuse, the appearance of favoritism, and the risk of
imposing on a captive audience. These are reasonable legislative
objectives advanced by the city in a proprietary capacity.
Justice Douglas concurred, observing that the advertising space, if
a forum at all, "is more akin to a newspaper than to a park" and, like
a newspaper, the city "owner cannot be forced to include in his
offerings news or other items which outsiders may desire but which
the owner abhors. '' 159 The dissenters insisted that the city had
created a public forum by permitting some advertising and that it
was thereby impermissible to deny access on the basis of content or
subject matter or to permit commercial messages while prohibiting
political communication.
The Lehman decision tends to confirm our property thesis in two
ways. The Court sanctioned municipal dominion over its property
as a sufficient basis to restrict speech and it upheld state discrimination in favor of commercial speech over political speech. 160
Government's control of its property was solidified in 1976 when
the Army prohibited political speeches and leaflet distribution on
the premises of Fort Dix, New Jersey, even on portions of the
military post generally open to the public. In Greer v. Spock, 6 ' the
1s8 ld. at

159 Id.

303-4.

at 306.

160In Southeastern Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad, 420 U.S. 546 (1975), a city had denied

the use of its municipal theater to the rock musical Hair on the ground that the production
was obscene. Justice Blackmun, without reference to his Lehman opinion, concluded that the
city's action "was no less a prior restraint because the public facilities under their control
happened to be municipal theaters. The [facilities] were public forums designed for and
dedicated to expressive activities," 420 U.S. at 555. Justice Rehnquist dissented, relying on
Adderley for the position that the city, as owner of the theater, had broad leeway to decide
what productions should be permitted. See Karst, PublicEnterprise and the Public Forum: A
Comment on Southeastern Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad, 37 OHIO ST. L.J. 247, 248-52 (1976);

Stone, Restrictionsof Speech Because of Its Content: The PeculiarCase of Subject-MatterRestrictions,
46 U. CHI. L. REv. 81, 90-92 (1978).
161

424 U.S. 828 (1976).
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such
Court sharply limited a 1972 decision that had 16permitted
3
62
activity on the open portions of a base.' It said:
The Court of Appeals was mistaken .

.

. in thinking that [the

1972 decision] stands for the principle that whenever members
of the public are permitted freely to visit a place owned or
operated by the Government, then that place becomes a "public
"The State,
forum" for purposes of the First Amendment ....
no less than a private owner of property, has power to preserve
the property under its control for the use of which it is lawfully
dedicated."
64
The Court readily upheld the military regulation. 1
The Court has since applied these principles to permit military
commanders broad power to regulate speech activities within16 a
military base even by military personnel properly on the base
and to treat prison facilities as "off-limits" to the application of
normal First Amendment activities: "A prison may be no166more
easily converted into a public forum than a military base."
Most recently, in United States Postal Service v. Council of Greenburgh CivicAssociations, 167 the Court has confirmed its willingness to
accord government broad power to restrict speech that impairs
governmental control of its property. The issue was whether a
postal statute, prohibiting the deposit of unstamped "mailable matter" in a letter box approved as an "authorized depository" by the
postal service, violated the First Amendment rights of civic groups
which delivered unstamped messages and leaflets in the letter boxes
12 Flower v. United States, 407 U.S. 197 (1972).
163424 U.S. at 836. The Court also observed that excluding the political speakers served
the "American constitutional tradition of a politically neutral military establishment under
civilian control." Id. at 839.
164Greer's sharp limitation of Flower was similar to the Court's analysis two weeks earlier,
in Hudgens v. NLRB, 424 U.S. 507 (1976) of the Logan Valley/Lloyd Center sequence. Justice
Rehnquist has described Greer as a case reflecting the "sovereign's" role as "proprietor and
owner of property, such as buildings or parks." The FirstAmendment: Freedom, Philosophy and
the Law, 12 GONZ. L. REv. 1, 10-11 (1976). See also Consolidated Edison Co. v. Public
Service Commission, 447 U.S. 530 (1980); Board of Education, Island Trees Union Free
School District v. Pico, 102 S. Ct. 2799, 2812 (1982) (Blackmun, J., concurring); id. at 2827
(Rehnquist, J., dissenting). Justice Rehnquist recently reiterated his views on government's
power over its property. Dallas County Hospital District v. Dallas Ass'n of Community
Organizations for Reform Now, cert. denied, 51 U.S.L.W. 3417 (Nov. 29, 1982) (Rehnquist,
J., dissenting).
'1 See Brown v. Glines, 444 U.S. 348 (1980).
166Jones v. North Carolina Prisoners' Union, 433 U.S. 119, 134 (1977); see also Bell v.
Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 548-55 (1979); Houchins v. KQED, 438 U.S. 1 (1978).
167453 U.S. 114 (1981).
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of private homes. After canvassing the history and functions of the
postal service, Justice Rehnquist concluded that even though the
homeowner "pays for the physical components" of the "authorized
depository," the homeowner "agrees to abide by the Postal Service's regulations in exchange for the Postal Service agreeing to
deliver and pick up his mail." 16 The Court analyzed the case in
the property in question. In this
terms of government ownership of 169
light, the result was foreordained:
Indeed, it is difficult to conceive of any reason why this Court
should treat a letterbox differently for First Amendment access
purposes than it has in the past treated the military base in Greer
.... the jail or prison inJones,... or the advertising space made
available in city rapid transit cars in Lehman, . . . In all these
cases, this Court recognized that the First Amendment does not
guarantee access to property simply because it is owned or controlled by the government.
The Court determined that it was unnecessary to address "time,
place and manner" issues in order to conclude that the postal statute
restriction did not violate the First Amendment.
As he had in Adderley, Lehman, and Greer, Justice Brennan
17 0
adopted a different approach:
... Our cases have recognized generally that public properties
are appropriate fora for exercise of First Amendment rights....
While First Amendment rights exercised on public property
may be subject to reasonable time, place and manner restrictions, that is very different from saying that governmentcontrolled property, such as a letterbox, does not constitute a
public forum.

And Justice Marshall maintained in dissent that "[t]he determinative question in each of these [earlier] cases was not whether the
government owned or controlled the property, but whether the
on
nature of the governmental interests warranted the restrictions
' 71
case.
this
in
asked
properly
question
the
is
That
expression.
Justice Marshall's point is telling. For the Burger Court, the

168Id. at 128.
'69

Id. at 129-30.

17o Id. at 136-37. Justice Brennan found the statute a reasonable time, place, and manner
rule.
171Id. at 149 n.7. Cf. Heffron v. Int'l Society for Krishna Consciousness, 452 U.S. 640

(1981); Widmar v. Vincent, 102 S. Ct. 269 (1981).
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question "whether the government owned or controlled the property" has been central, and the issue "whether the nature of the
governmental interest warranted the restrictions on expression" has
been marginal. Instead of determining whether the precise nature
of the facility rendered the speech activity "anomalous" or "basically incompatible" with the property's primary functions, the
Court has permitted formal ownership and control of property to
be decisive.
2. Residentialproperty. The government won the postal case because it was found to have had the superior property-type interests
in the mailbox. Justice Stevens's dissenting
opinion was equally
172
considerations:
property
in
steeped
The mailbox is private property; it is not a public forum to
which the owner must grant access. If the owner does not want
to receive any written communications other than stamped mail,
he should be permitted to post the equivalent of a "no trespassing" sign on his mailbox. A statute that protects his privacy by
prohibiting unsolicited and unwanted deposits on his property
would surely be valid.
Justice Stevens's concern with "unwanted deposits" of free speech
on private property evokes other instances of tension between free
speech claims and protection of the value of residential and commercial property.
In a cluster of cases involving diverse issues such as door-to-door
canvassing, regulation of pornography and sexually oriented material, and zoning, the Court has approached First Amendment
claims with the zeal of urban planners. This tendency was evident
in three cases putting homeowners' rights of property and privacy
against the rights of free speech of canvassers and picketers. In each
instance the Court was able to decide the case without resolving the
clash between property rights and speech claims, but it used strong
language indicating that homeowners' rights would prevail over
speakers'.
In 1976, the Court reviewed an ordinance that required, for
"identification" purposes, advance notice in writing to the police by
''any person desiring to canvass . . . or call from house to house [for]
a recognized charitable [or] political . . . cause." 173 The Court in172453 U.S. at 152. Justice Stevens dissented because the statute interfered with the
homeowners' right to decide whether they wanted to receive the messages.
171Hynes v. Mayor of Oradell, 425 U.S. 610 (1976).
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validated the ordinance on vagueness grounds. Six Justices concluded that, "vagueness defects aside, an ordinance of this kind
'
would ordinarily withstand constitutional attack." 174
A similar approach was taken in a case involving a local ordinance that prohibited door-to-door solicitation by charitable organizations that
devoted more than twenty-five percent of their revenue to organizational expenses. The Court reaffirmed that such solicitation, even
though involving political and charitable causes, can be regulated
by government in order to protect the privacy of homeowners
against fraud, crime, or annoyance.17 The particular ordinance
was invalidated, however, because the twenty-five-percent limitation did not bear a sufficiently substantial relationship to such goals.
The Court also addressed these issues in a case involving residential picketing. A civil rights group challenged an Illinois statute that
had the effect of preventing demonstrations on the public sidewalks
in front of the home of the Mayor of Chicago. The Court invalidated the statute on equal protection grounds because it exempted certain kinds of labor dispute picketing from the general
prohibition on residential picketing. 176 It expressly left unresolved
the question "whether a statute barring all residential picketing
regardless of its subject matter would violate the First and Fourteenth Amendments.' ' 177 But, in dictum, the majority asserted the
broad protection that it would afford to privacy, even against free
speech claims, where the ban on residential picketing was content
neutral:' 78 "The State's interest in protecting the well-being, tranquility, and privacy of the home is certainly of the highest order in
a free and civilized society." While the Court's decision invalidated
a particular ban on residential picketing at the behest of free speech
claimants, its message that homeowners be permitted the quiet use
and enjoyment of their property against free speech claims may be
its more lasting element.
3. Property "values." A series of Burger Court First Amendment
rulings reflect basic concern for the protection of property interests.
174 Id. at 623. This was Justice Brennan's characterization of the majority opinion.
175

Village of Schaumburg v. Citizens for a Better Environment, 444 U.S. 620 (1980).
v. Brown, 447 U.S. 445 (1980). Justice Brennan's opinion found the case "con-

176 Carey

stitutionally indistinguishable" from Police Department of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92
(1972).
177 447 U.S. at 459 n.2.
178Id. at 470, 471.
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The most important of these relate to sexually oriented speech. For
example, the Court rejected a challenge to the notion that there
exists a distinct category of "obscene" speech, which can be regulated in ways constitutionally unacceptable for other forms of expression.' 79 These decisions also confound normal First Amendment doctrine by permitting plenary regulation
of a category of
80
speech causing no demonstrable harm.'
In the watershed case, ParisAdult Theaters I, the majority relied
on the proposition, foreign to First Amendment adjudication, that
the Court is not "a super-legislature to determine the wisdom, need
and propriety of laws that touch economic problemns, business affairs, or social conditions."'' The preoccupation with commercial,
economic, and property matters is particularly noteworthy when it
is recalled that the issue was whether government could prohibit
the availability of "adults only" sexual ideas to willing adult recipients. A 1969 Warren Court decision had found a First Amendment
right to receive such ideas, albeit in the privacy of the home,
82
superior to the claimed harm resulting from access to obscenity.'
In rejecting that precedent, Chief Justice Burger emphasized governmental interests of a different order:183
[T]here are legitimate state interests at stake in stemming the tide
of commercialized obscenity, even assuming it is feasible to enforce effective safeguards against exposure to juveniles and to
passersby .... [These] include the interest of the public in the
quality of life and the total community environment, the tone of
commerce in the great city centers, and, possibly, the public
safety itself.
It is surprising that such interests, primarily rooted in notions
of environmental pollution, aesthetic zoning, and preservation of
commercial areas, would be found paramount to free speech concerns. Similarly curious was the Court's insistence that just as government is free to act on the basis of "unprovable assumptions" in
the "regulation of commercial and business affairs," it has compar"' Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973); Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49
(1973).
"I The Report of the Commission on Obscenity and Pornography (1970); DE GRAZIA &
NEWMA.N, BANNED FILMs: MOVIES, CENSORS AND THE FIRST AM\IE:NDMENT (1982).
,81
U.S. at 64 (quoting Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 482 [1965]).
182See Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557 (1969).
183413 U.S. at 57-58.
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ably broad leeway to regulate speech:' 84 "Understandably, those
who entertain an absolutist view of the First Amendment find it
uncomfortable to explain why rights of association, speech and
press should be severely restrained in the marketplace of goods and
money, but not in the marketplace of pornography." In this view, if
government is permitted to regulate speech in the economic marketplace to further the community welfare, it can regulate other
forms of speech in the same fashion. Speech interests will be subordinated to the goal of achieving clean, stable, and orderly downtown areas, and the property and economic interests promoted by
such developments.
These priorities became more explicit three years later in Young
v. American Mini Theatres.'85 The Court upheld a Detroit zoning
ordinance which differentiated between motion picture theaters
and bookstores that exhibited sexually explicit "adult" books and
movies and those which did not. The ordinance required that such
establishments not be located within 1,000 feet of any two other
"regulated uses" or within 500 feet of a residential area. All Justices
recognized that the regulated establishments offered materials that
were not within the constitutional definition of obscenity. Nevertheless, a five-to-four majority upheld the ordinance, relying in part
on a finding of the Detroit Common Council that "some uses of
property are especially injurious to a neighborhood when they are
' Justice Powell's concurring opinconcentrated in limited areas." 186
ion is even more clearly dominated by property considerations. He
viewed the case as "an example of innovative land-use regulation,
implicating First Amendment concerns only incidentally and to a
187
limited extent.'
In many of these cases property interests conflict-the free
speech and property rights of commercial purveyors of books and
movies are arrayed against the property owners of the surrounding
community. The Detroit case curbed the rights of the owners of
regulated establishments in the course of protecting the value of the
surrounding property against uses which, in the city's words, "ad184Id.
18s427

at 62.
U.S. 50 (1976).

186 Id. at
187 Id.

54.

at 73.
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versely affect[ed] property values."' 8 By contrast, when the proprietor of a drive-in movie showing sexually suggestive films
succeeded in invalidating a restrictive ordinance, the counterpoised property interests of the community were not deemed as
weighty-the screen was on a busy highway and visible only from
two adjacent streets and a little used church parking lot-and the
restriction was not imposed as part of a comprehensive zoning plan
89
designed to protect property values.'
The concept that speech may be controlled to the extent of its
deleterious effect on surrounding property interests also worked its
way into a decision that upheld FCC regulation of a radio monologue that was found to be "indecent but not obscene" because it
included "dirty words."' 90 Although the case can be explained in
terms of federal power over the air waves, as well as domestic
privacy, Justice Stevens, who wrote the Detroit decision, underscored his rejection
of the free speech claim by analogy to the
19 1
zoning power:
The Commission's decision rested entirely on a nuisance
rationale under which context is all important. . . . As Mr.
Justice Sutherland wrote, a "nuisance may be merely a right
thing in the wrong place-like a pig in the parlor instead of the
barnyard." Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co.... We simply hold that
when the Commission finds that a pig has entered the parlor, the
exercise of its regulatory power does not depend on proof that
the pig is obscene.
Speech and property values clashed again in Metromedia, Inc. v.
City of San Diego,' 92 which tested the validity of municipal zoning
restrictions against billboards. Five separate opinions resulted in a
narrow invalidation of the ordinance because some forms of bill"s

Id. at 55.

189 Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205 (1975). See also Moore v. City of East

Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494 (1977).
'9

FCC v. Pacifica Foundation, 438 U.S. 726 (1978).

191 Id. at 750. Recent Burger Court decisions confirm that local government, at least in

some contexts, may subordinate speech interests to property and community values through
the careful exercise of the zoning power. Vance v. Universal Amusement Co., 445 U.S. 308
(1980); Schad v. Borough of Mount Ephraim, 452 U.S. 61 (1981). Recently, however, the
Court invalidated, on separation grounds, a statute designed to shield churches from close
proximity to premises where liquor is sold. Larkin v. Grendel's Den, Inc., 103 S.Ct.

(1982).
192 453

U.S. 490 (1981).
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board advertising were permitted while others were proscribed.
But seven members of the Court, relying in part on the ordinance's
purpose "to safeguard and enhance property values," would permit
broad, nondiscriminatory prohibition of billboards in order to
achieve the "twin goals [of] traffic safety and the appearance of the
city. ,193
A four-Justice plurality interpreted the ordinance as permitting

some "on-site" billboard advertising: "The occupant of property
may advertise his own goods or services; he may not advertise the
goods or services of others, nor may he display most noncommercial messages." '1 94 The plurality found it constitutionally permissible for a city allowing on-site billboards to ban "off-site" commercial advertising on billboards, because commercial speech is
entitled to lesser protection and thus subject to broader regulation.
To that extent, the "city's land-use interests" outweighed "the commercial interests of those seeking to purvey goods and services
within the city."19' 5 The defect in the ordinance was that the city
allowed some kinds of commercial billboards but prohibited other
kinds of noncommercial messages without adequate justification for
the content distinctions.
Justices Brennan and Blackmun, though willing to recognize the
validity of some "place and manner" restrictions on billboards,
found the ordinance broadly unconstitutional as an unjustified total
96
ban on an important medium of communication:'
. . . the city has failed to show that its asserted interest in
aesthetics is sufficiently substantial in the commercial and industrial areas of San Diego. I do not doubt that "[it is within the
power of the [city] to determine that the community should be
beautiful," . . . but that power may not be exercised in contravention of the First Amendment.
Chief Justice Burger's dissent, evoking his opinions in the 1973
19 7
obscenity decisions, saw the issues differently:
-9 Id.

at 507.

Id.

at 503.

194

195Id. at
196

512.

Id. at 530.

197 Id. at 557, 559-60. Justice Rehnquist's dissent was even more succinct: "[Tihe aesthetic
justification alone is sufficient to sustain a total prohibition of billboards within a community." Id. at 570.
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[W]e are discussing a very simple and basic question: the authority of local government to protect its citizens' legitimate interests
in traffic safety and the environment by eliminating distracting
and ugly structures from its building and roadways, to define
which billboards actually pose that danger, and to decide
whether, in certain instances, the public's need for the information outweighs the dangers perceived.
Justice Stevens also stressed the property theme in his dissent.
Comparing billboards to graffiti,
he reasoned that both forms of
19
expression could be banned: 8
It seems to be accepted by all that a zoning regulation excluding billboards from residential neighborhoods is justified by the
interest in maintaining pleasant surroundings and enhancingproperty values. The same interests are at work in commercial and
industrial zones .... Those interests are both psychological and
economic. The characterof the environment affectsproperty values and

the quality of life not only for the suburban resident, but equally
for the individual who toils in a factory or invests his capital in
industrial properties.
Finding no censorial motive for the ordinance, Justice Stevens
found it constitutional.
The billboard decision is instructive. When speech interests conflict with property and environmental values protected by government through zoning measures, speech will take second place to the
interests in "enhancing property values" and preventing "ugly" and
"unsightly eyesores." Attractive urban centers and quiet and orderly residential communities are surely important, but they
should not be achieved at the expense of the First Amendment.
Urban planning goals and zoning schemes should not enjoy "talismanic immunity"' 9 9 from close First Amendment scrutiny. Moreover, the Court's preference for neat, orderly commercial and
residential environments, wholly uncluttered by "unsightly"
manifestations of free speech, stands in sharp contrast to a different
perception of the untidiness that society must tolerate to maintain

'9 Id. at 552 (emphasis added).
'9 Young v. American Mini Theatres, 427 U.S. 50, 75 (1976) (Powell, J., concurring);
Schad v. Mt. Ephraim, 452 U.S. 61, 101 S. Ct. 2176, 2187 (1981) (Blackmun, J., concurring).
For an extremely helpful analysis of these issues, see Costonis, Law and Aesthetics: A Critique
and a Reformation of the Dilemmas, 80 MICH. L. REV. 355, 446-58 (1972).
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free expression. As Justice Harlan stated in Cohen v.
the values of
0
20

California:

To many, the immediate consequence of this freedom may
often appear to be only verbal tumult, discord, and even offensive utterance. These are, however, within established limits, in
truth necessary side effects of the broader enduring values which
the process of open debate permits us to achieve. That the air
may at times seem filled with verbal cacophony is, in this sense,
not a sign of weakness, but of strength.
IV. CONCLUSION
The apparently close link between the Burger Court's free
speech decisions and traditional property interests is consistent
with a decade of jurisprudence in the Supreme Court. An older
concept that a primary office of civil liberties is to safeguard the
liberty of property and contract has reemerged. For most of two
centuries the protection of property and contract was viewed as the
cornerstone of the protection of liberty. John Adams went so far as
to say, "Property must be secured or liberty cannot exist."2 °1 More
recently Justice Stewart observed: ". . . a fundamental interdependence exists between the personal right to liberty and the personal
right in property .... That rights in property are basic civil rights
has long been recognized. 20 2 And the originator of the "new property" concept believed that property-"new" or "old"-and liberty
were inextricably intertwined in providing the individual a buffer
against the state.20 3
We do not denigrate the important role of private property as a
protector of civil liberties. Nor do we suggest that free speech and
property are inherently antithetical. Although they may frequently
be in conflict, the values embodied in the two concepts play a
complementary role in the maintenance of liberal democracy, however imperfect. As the Court has observed: "[T]he Framers of the
403 U.S. at 24-25 (1971).
ADAMS, DISCOURSES ON DAVILA (1789-90), quoted in COKER, DMiOcRAcy, LIBERTY,
AND PROPERTY 466 (1947). See FREUND, THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
35-37 (1961).
202 Lynch v. Household Finance Corp., 405 U.S. 538, 552 (1972).
203 Reich, note 21 supra, at 786-87. See also MICHELMAN, note 36 supra.
200
20'
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Constitution certainly did not think these fundamental
rights of a
20 4
free society are incompatible with each other."
By the same token, it is unnecessary to take the position that
property interests should always be subordinated to free speech
values. Thus, even a low-decibel speaker could not properly assert
a right to orate or even to converse in another's living room without
permission. Nor is it clear that someone wishing to open a bookstore in a neighborhood zoned for residential use could validly
complain that the First Amendment provided a right that overrode
a neutrally applied zoning law.
Individual ownership of property is thus closely linked to civil
liberty. That is not to say that property concepts must underlie
protection of free speech. We see no basis in principle for this in
light of the independent values that gird the First Amendment.
These purposes are well known and can be briefly summarized.
The first is individual fulfillment through self-expression. As Justice Brandeis put it: "the final end of the State [is] to make men free
to develop their faculties." 2 °5 The second major justification
stresses concepts of self-government and political democracy. This
theory of free speech was powerfully formulated by Professor Alexander Meildejohn and, in a well-known passage, underlined by
Justice Brennan, who affirmed the "profound national commitment
to the principle that debate on public issues should be uninhibited,
robust, and wide-open." 20 6 The third major purpose of the First
Amendment is its purifying quality in advancing knowledge and
discovering truth. Or, in Justice Holmes' metaphor, "the best test
of truth is the power of the thought to get itself accepted in the
competition of the market. 20 7 And finally, "freedom of expression
is a method of achieving a more adaptable and hence a more stable
community, of maintaining the precarious balance between healthy
cleavage and necessary consensus."208
These are the classic purposes of the First Amendment. Each
alone may not be compelling, but their sum posits a powerful case
4 Lloyd Corp. v. Tanner, 407 U.S. 551, 570 (1972).
205 Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 375 (1927).
206 New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964).
207 Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919).
208 FMERSON, note 48 supra, at 7.
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for free expression. We see no reason to diminish constitutional
protection when property interests clash with free speech values.
After considerable exposure to both academic discourse and courtroom combat relating to free speech, we have rarely found a person
who openly belittles the worth of the constitutional guarantee. To
the contrary, everyone professes to support it. Why then the sharp
differences among judges and scholars? We suggest that these turn
not merely on whether the disputants agree with purposes of the
First Amendment but rather on the degree to which they embrace
them. 2° 9 The degree of adherence cannot of course be measured,
but it is palpable when one reads judicial opinions, law review
articles, or even the briefs of lawyers. Like Justice Stewart's approach to hard-core obscenity, one knows it when one sees it.
Contrast, for example, Justice Holmes' opinion in Schenck 210 with
his dissent in Abrams.2 1 1 Compare the opinion of Justice Harlan in
Barenblatt 12 with the Harlan of Cohen v. California.2 13 Stack up the
opinions of Justice Frankfurter against those of Justices Black and
Douglas, and the articles of Alexander Bickel and Philip Kurland
against those of Thomas Emerson and Harry Kalven, Jr. The differences are intellectual only in part.
The Court's pattern of downgrading free speech when it has
appeared to conflict with proprietary rights asserted by individuals,
corporations, or even government expresses an erroneous set of
priorities. The Court has treated the First Amendment merely as
one more factor to be weighed in the constitutional balance rather
than as the first among equals in the American pantheon of lib-

erty.

2 14

Free speech and property in fact represent different sorts of constitutional liberty. Property is bottomed on protection of wealth
2

"9 Justice Frankfurter was making much the same point when he responded to Justice
Holmes's famous dictum that "[gleneral propositions do not decide concrete cases," Lochner
v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 76 (1905), by observing, "Whether they do or not often depends
on the strength of the conviction with which such 'general propositions' are held." Harris v.
United States, 331 U.S. 145, 157 (1947) (dissenting opinion). See Dorsen, Book Review, 95
HARV. L. REv. 367, 384 (1981).

,10 Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919).
211 Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616 (1919).
212 Barenblatt v. United States, 360 U.S. 109 (1959).
213 403 U.S. 15 (1971).

214 See McKay, The Preferencefor Freedom, 34 N.Y.U.L. REV. 1182 (1959).
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and "settled expectations," within the larger context of a model of
society that is orderly, stable, prudent, and rational. Robust free
speech, by contrast, can be untidy, boisterous, and risky. But the
alternative of viewing free speech as just another "value" among
many presents far greater costs. We cast our lot with the risk takers:
Justice Brandeis of Whitney,215 Justice Douglas of Brandenburg,2" 6
and Justice Harlan of Cohen,
when he expressed his conservative
2 17
follows:
as
freedom
in
faith
The constitutional right of free expression is powerful medicine
in a society as diverse and populous as ours. It is designed and
intended to remove governmental restraints from the arena of
public discussion, putting the decision as to what views shall be
voiced largely into the hands of each of us, in the hope that use of
such freedom will ultimately produce a more capable citizenry
and more perfect polity and in the belief that no other approach
would comport with the premise of individual dignity and
choice upon which our political system rests.
Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357 (1927).
W15
216 Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969).
217 Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 24 (1971).
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